Question 1
A state statute prohibits all commercial activity in public parks without a permit. The purpose of the statute is to reduce congestion, noise, and litter, and it has been consistently enforced for decades. The permitting authority routinely grants permits to vendors, entertainers, and political groups without regard to viewpoint, as long as the applicants comply with safety and sanitation requirements.
A group called “Voices of the Poor” regularly distributes free meals and religious pamphlets in a large downtown park as part of its religious mission to serve the needy. Members of the group were cited for violating the statute when they distributed food and pamphlets without a permit. The group filed suit in federal court challenging the statute as applied to them, claiming that it violated their rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech Clause. Assume no federal statutes apply.
As applied to Voices of the Poor, the court should rule that the statute is
A. unconstitutional, because the statute substantially burdens religious conduct and is not the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s goal.
B. unconstitutional, because requiring a permit before engaging in religious expression constitutes a prior restraint.
C. constitutional, because it is a neutral and generally applicable regulation reasonably related to legitimate government interests.
D. constitutional, because religious activity in public parks is not protected expressive conduct.
Answer
C
The Free Exercise Clause does not exempt individuals from compliance with neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religious practice. Similarly, content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations affecting speech are upheld if they are reasonable and serve important governmental interests.
Here, the statute prohibits all commercial activity without a permit, regardless of religious or political content. It is enforced uniformly and does not target religious conduct. The state’s goals—reducing congestion, noise, and litter—are legitimate governmental interests, and the permitting scheme is administered without regard to viewpoint. The law does not prohibit religious activity outright; it merely regulates how commercial-type conduct occurs in public parks.
Therefore, because the statute is neutral, generally applicable, and rationally related to legitimate government objectives, it is constitutional as applied to the group.
Question 2
Compound Z is a chemical used in agricultural fertilizers to prevent soil erosion and increase crop yields. Health officials have warned that improper use of Compound Z may pollute groundwater and endanger drinking water supplies. Compound Z is currently manufactured only in the state of Red.
In an effort to raise federal revenue, Congress enacted a statute imposing a $75 excise tax on each ton of Compound Z sold in the United States. The tax is likely to raise the cost of Compound Z and may discourage farmers from using it, potentially increasing soil erosion and harming interstate agricultural markets. Manufacturers of Compound Z in Red have filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the tax.
Is the tax constitutional?
A. No, because the tax will negatively affect interstate agriculture, which Congress has a duty under the Commerce Clause to protect.
B. No, because the tax applies only to manufacturers in a single state and therefore violates the constitutional requirement of uniformity.
C. Yes, because Congress may tax any economic activity that could affect interstate commerce.
D. Yes, because Congress has broad discretion to impose taxes for raising revenue, even if the tax has regulatory effects, and the tax does not violate any constitutional prohibition.
Answer
D
Congress has broad authority under Article I of the United States Constitution to impose taxes in order to raise revenue for the general welfare. A tax is constitutionally valid so long as it is intended to raise revenue and is not prohibited by any specific constitutional provision.
Here, Congress imposed a $75 excise tax on each ton of Compound Z sold in the United States. Nothing in the facts suggests that the tax is intended solely as a regulatory penalty or that it is a pretext for controlling behavior rather than raising revenue. The tax therefore bears a reasonable relationship to revenue production.
Although Compound Z is currently manufactured only in the state of Red, the tax does not violate the Uniformity Clause because it applies to all sales of Compound Z nationwide. The constitutional requirement of uniformity refers to geographic uniformity, not economic impact. A tax does not become unconstitutional simply because its burden falls more heavily on producers in a single state.
Further, Congress is not required to avoid harming an industry in order to exercise its taxing power. A tax does not become unconstitutional merely because it produces incidental regulatory effects.
Because the tax is reasonably related to revenue production and does not violate any constitutional prohibition, it is constitutional.
Question 3
The City of Silverlake recently created a new municipal Housing Authority to manage the construction and maintenance of affordable housing within the city. The Housing Authority is an independent governmental entity incorporated under state law. The population it serves is racially, ethnically, and economically diverse, and there has been no finding of past discrimination within the Housing Authority or the newly developed neighborhoods it oversees.
The Housing Authority is governed by a seven-member elected board, two of whom are members of racial minority groups. At its first official session, the board adopted a hiring and contracting policy reserving 30% of all staff positions and 30% of all construction and maintenance contracts for firms and individuals who are members of racial minority groups. The stated purpose of the policy is “to counteract the long-term, nationwide disadvantages faced by minority groups and to promote greater economic inclusion.” No federal statute applies.
A group of qualified employees and contractors who do not fall within the preferred groups bring suit challenging the constitutionality of the set-asides.
Under applicable United States Supreme Court precedent, the set-asides are
A. unconstitutional, because they constitute racial classifications that deny non-preferred applicants the equal protection of the laws.
B. unconstitutional, because they interfere with the liberty to engage in the common occupations of life without arbitrary government restrictions.
C. constitutional, because promoting economic inclusion is a compelling government interest that justifies racial preferences.
D. constitutional, because municipal authorities performing proprietary functions are exempt from strict equal protection scrutiny.
Answer
A
Under the Equal Protection Clause, all racial classifications imposed by government—beneficial or burdensome—are subject to strict scrutiny. Numerical set-aside programs may be upheld only when they are narrowly tailored to remedy identified, specific past discrimination by the governmental entity implementing the program.
Here, the Housing Authority:
- Is newly created,
- Has no documented history of past discrimination, and
- Bases its policy on broad, generalized concepts of national historical discrimination rather than specific wrongs committed by the Authority or the community it serves.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that general societal discrimination is insufficient to justify numerical racial preferences. Without concrete evidence of prior discriminatory practices by the Housing Authority itself, the 30% set-aside fails strict scrutiny.
Therefore, the set-asides are unconstitutional because they deny others the equal protection of the laws.
Question 4
Recent reports indicate a significant increase in illegal dumping of hazardous chemicals near public parks, posing risks to children and local ecosystems. In response, Congress enacted a statute directing each state environmental agency to adopt regulations making it a state offense to dump, store, or transport hazardous chemicals within 2,000 feet of any public park unless the activity is authorized by a state-issued environmental permit.
The statute expressly states that its purpose is to “ensure uniform state regulation of hazardous chemical disposal in areas where children congregate.” The law contains no federal enforcement mechanism; instead, it places full responsibility on the states to enact and enforce the required regulations. Assume no federal funding is threatened, no grant conditions are attached, and no federal statute preempts state law.
A group of state officials file suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
The statute is
A. unconstitutional, because Congress may not commandeer state legislative or regulatory processes by compelling them to adopt or administer federal regulatory schemes.
B. unconstitutional, because hazardous waste disposal near public parks has only a tenuous relationship to interstate commerce and therefore cannot be federally regulated.
C. constitutional, because protecting children from hazardous materials is a legitimate federal interest that permits Congress to require state cooperation.
D. constitutional, because Congress may regulate the transportation and disposal of hazardous chemicals as part of its authority over the channels of interstate commerce.
Answer
A
Under the Tenth Amendment and the anti-commandeering doctrine (as articulated in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States), Congress may not require state legislatures or state executive agencies to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. While Congress may regulate individuals directly or encourage state cooperation through incentives (such as conditional grants), it cannot compel a state to legislate or administer federal law.
Here, Congress orders every state environmental agency to:
- enact specific regulations, and
- create and enforce a state criminal offense.
This is classic commandeering. The statute forces the states to regulate according to Congress’s instructions and provides no federal alternative or enforcement. Because the statute does not induce compliance through spending conditions or preemption, but instead commands direct state action, it violates the Tenth Amendment.
Accordingly, the federal statute is unconstitutional.
Question 5
Congress recently enacted a statute making it a federal crime to “engage in any communication that unduly interferes with the free and fair operation of digital marketplaces.” The statute does not define the term “unduly interferes.” No prosecutions have been brought under the new law.
A national association of technology ethicists—whose mission is to promote clarity and transparency in laws affecting online communication—believes that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. None of the association’s members engage in commercial digital marketplace activities, nor do they plan to do so in the future. The association and several of its members file suit in federal district court against the U.S. Attorney General seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the new statute.
May the federal court reach the merits of the suit?
A. Yes, because federal courts have the authority to determine whether an ambiguous criminal statute violates due process.
B. Yes, because the plaintiffs seek prospective equitable relief—an injunction—which federal courts are empowered to grant.
C. No, because neither the association nor its members have suffered or will suffer an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements.
D. No, because a federal court may never entertain a pre-enforcement challenge to a criminal statute.
Answer
C
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. An organization bringing suit on behalf of its members must also meet the requirements for associational standing, including that at least one member has standing in their own right.
Here, neither the association nor its members engage in any conduct regulated by the statute, nor do they intend to do so in the future. Because they face no credible threat of prosecution, they lack an injury in fact. A mere interest in having clearer criminal laws is insufficient to meet Article III requirements.
Furthermore, the association cannot rely on associational standing because no individual member has standing.
Thus, the federal court may not consider the merits of the lawsuit because the plaintiffs lack a sufficient personal stake to create a justiciable Article III controversy.
Question 6
A city ordinance prohibits the placement of vending racks on public sidewalks if the racks distribute coupon books or promotional flyers. The ordinance was enacted to reduce visual clutter and litter on downtown streets. However, the city continues to permit vending racks that distribute newspapers, community newsletters, and other non-advertising publications. As a result of the ordinance, 25 of the 250 vending racks downtown were removed.
A company that distributes coupon books challenges the ordinance on First Amendment grounds.
Is the ordinance constitutional?
A. Yes, because commercial speech receives only minimal protection under the First Amendment and may be prohibited whenever the government asserts a legitimate interest.
B. Yes, because reducing sidewalk litter is a substantial governmental interest and banning advertising racks is necessary to achieve that interest.
C. No, because the ordinance is underinclusive in advancing the city’s stated interest, and it therefore fails intermediate scrutiny.
D. No, because commercial speech may not be regulated unless the government demonstrates a compelling interest and uses the least restrictive means.
Answer
C
Truthful commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment and may be regulated only if the regulation satisfies intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The government must show that:
- It has a substantial interest,
- The regulation directly advances that interest, and
- The regulation is narrowly tailored with a reasonable fit between means and ends.
Here, the city claims an interest in reducing litter and improving aesthetics—both substantial interests. However, the ordinance bans only racks that distribute coupon books and promotional flyers while allowing other publication racks that create the same aesthetic and litter problems. The underinclusiveness of the ordinance demonstrates that it does not directly and materially advance the government’s stated interest and is not a reasonable fit.
Because the city selectively banned only one small category of vending racks (25 out of 250), the regulation is insufficiently tailored and therefore unconstitutional.
Question 7
The state of Westmont enacted a statute requiring that all official police-investigation files concerning suspects who were never charged with a crime be permanently sealed from public inspection. The stated purpose of the statute is to protect innocent individuals from unwarranted stigma and to encourage cooperation with law enforcement. The statute, however, does not prohibit anyone in possession of such information from publishing it.
A well-known community activist in Riverview, Westmont, was publicly identified as a suspect in a corruption probe but was never charged. Shortly thereafter, the police announced the investigation had been closed for lack of evidence. Pursuant to the Westmont statute, the investigation files were sealed.
The Riverview Herald sought access to the sealed files to examine whether law enforcement acted appropriately but was denied. The newspaper then filed suit against state officials seeking access to the files and challenging the statute on constitutional grounds.
Which fact would most help Westmont defend the constitutionality of its statute?
A. The statute applies equally to the files of all individuals who were investigated but never charged with a crime.
B. The press has no greater constitutional right of access to government information than private citizens.
C. The statute restricts only access to state-held files and does not prohibit the publication of information acquired from private sources.
D. The legislature has plenary authority to restrict public access to any government records whenever it deems it beneficial.
Answer
C
The Supreme Court has made clear that while the government may not punish the publication of truthful information lawfully obtained, particularly when it comes from public records, it may control its own dissemination of information. There is no First Amendment right of access to all government records, and the press has no greater access rights than the general public.
Here, Westmont’s statute simply limits public access to official state files but does not bar anyone from publishing information obtained elsewhere. This distinction is critical: the state is regulating its own records, not press publication.
Thus, the fact that the statute restricts access only to government-held information while allowing publication from private sources is the strongest defense of its constitutionality.
Question 8
Congress enacted a statute allocating $5 million to fund a nationwide competition titled “Innovative Solutions for Improving Civic Engagement in the United States.” The statute states that its purpose is to gather feasible, creative proposals for strengthening voter participation and public involvement in government.
The statute specifies that entries will be judged on the basis of their “originality, practicality, and measurable impact.” It authorizes one grand prize of $750,000, ten second prizes of $100,000 each, and fifty third prizes of $25,000 each. It also directs that the competition’s judges are to be appointed by the Secretary of Education, and that any U.S. resident who is not a federal employee is eligible to participate.
A separate provision authorizes any federal taxpayer to bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
A federal taxpayer files suit seeking to invalidate the law.
How should the court rule?
A. Decline to reach the merits because the dispute raises political questions committed to the discretion of Congress.
B. Hold the statute unconstitutional because Congress impermissibly delegated legislative power to judges without providing adequate standards.
C. Hold the statute unconstitutional because using federal funds to encourage civic engagement exceeds Congress’s spending authority under Article I.
D. Hold the statute constitutional because it advances the general welfare, includes clear criteria, and provides sufficient guidance for administering the competition.
Answer
D
Under the Spending Clause, Congress may expend federal funds to promote the general welfare, and courts review such expenditures only for a reasonable relation to legitimate federal objectives. Congress also may delegate authority to executive officials so long as it provides an intelligible principle to guide their discretion.
Here, Congress appropriated money to solicit ideas for improving civic participation—an objective plainly related to the general welfare. The statute also sets out specific judging criteria (“originality, practicality, and measurable impact”) and outlines prize amounts and eligibility rules. These constitute intelligible standards sufficient to guide the administering officials.
Because the statute is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose and contains adequate guidelines, it is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power and does not constitute an unlawful delegation.
Therefore, the statute is constitutional.
Question 9
The county of Lakeside, in the state of Blue, borders the state of Yellow. Many residents of Lakeside commute daily to Goldport, a major metropolitan area located in Yellow. As a result, there is heavy daily traffic between Lakeside and Goldport, consisting mostly of private automobiles but also including ride-share vehicles and commercial shuttles.
To address what it describes as “severe roadway congestion,” Lakeside enacted an ordinance providing that only ride-share vehicles registered in Lakeside may pick up or drop off passengers within the county. The ordinance further provides that only residents of Lakeside may register ride-share vehicles in the county.
Ride-share drivers based in Goldport file suit challenging the ordinance on constitutional grounds.
What is the proper result?
A. Judgment for the Goldport drivers, because the ordinance is not the least restrictive means of addressing roadway congestion.
B. Judgment for the Goldport drivers, because the ordinance places an undue burden on interstate commerce by shielding Lakeside residents from outside competition without sufficient justification.
C. Judgment for Lakeside, because the ordinance applies equally to drivers from other counties within Blue and those from states other than Blue, and thus does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
D. Judgment for Lakeside, because economic regulations that do not target a suspect class are valid so long as they meet rational basis review.
Answer
B
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, states and localities may regulate local aspects of commerce so long as Congress has not acted. However, even a non-discriminatory law can violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if the burden it places on interstate commerce clearly exceeds its local benefits (Pike v. Bruce Church balancing).
Here, the ordinance does not single out out-of-staters alone—it also excludes ride-share drivers from other counties in Blue. So it is not discriminatory on its face.
Nevertheless, the ordinance still violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because:
- The stated purpose is reducing congestion, but private automobiles contribute far more to congestion than ride-share vehicles.
- Completely banning all non-Lakeside ride-share drivers is a highly protectionist measure, benefiting local drivers while doing little to alleviate congestion.
- The burdens on interstate commerce—cutting off access for drivers who regularly travel across state borders—substantially outweigh any local benefits.
Thus, the ordinance imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce and is unconstitutional.
Question 10
A city ordinance in Harbor City requires a permit to operate a commercial shuttle service within city limits. The ordinance states that the only criteria for receiving a permit are (1) safe driving ability, and (2) knowledge of Harbor City’s major routes and traffic laws. Applicants are evaluated through a written test, an oral exam, and an on-the-road demonstration.
The ordinance does not limit the number of permits that may be issued. It allows any resident to file a written objection to the issuance of a permit, but only on the ground that the applicant lacks the required qualifications. The ordinance authorizes the permitting board to decide, in its discretion, whether to conduct a hearing before ruling on an objection.
Alex applies for a shuttle permit and successfully completes all examinations. The city posts Alex’s name as a proposed permit holder. Morgan, a current shuttle operator, files an objection solely claiming that issuing a permit to Alex will reduce Morgan’s income and harm the value of Morgan’s existing business. Morgan demands an evidentiary hearing before Alex’s permit is issued. The permitting board declines to hold a hearing and issues the permit to Alex.
Morgan sues in state court, asserting that the Constitution requires a hearing before Alex’s permit may be granted.
The court should rule for
A. Morgan, because due process requires a hearing whenever government action may adversely affect a person’s economic interests.
B. Morgan, because allowing the permitting board to decide whether to hold a hearing violates procedural fairness.
C. the city, because Morgan accepted the permitting system and may not challenge its procedures.
D. the city, because Morgan has no property interest in being protected from lawful economic competition.
Answer
D
Procedural due process protections apply only when a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property. A property interest exists only when a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement, not a mere desire for a benefit or advantage.
Here, the ordinance expressly states:
- permits are issued based solely on qualifications, and
- the number of permits is not limited.
Therefore, existing permit holders like Morgan have no entitlement to be free from competition. Economic competition—even if it reduces income or business value—is not a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause.
Because Morgan lacks a constitutionally protected property interest, the city was not required to provide a hearing before issuing Alex’s permit.
Thus, the court should rule for the city.
Question 11
State Y enacted a statute regulating access to the general election ballot for candidates seeking statewide office. Under the statute, a candidate nominated in the most recent primary by one of the state’s two major parties may appear on the general election ballot by paying a $150 filing fee and submitting a certification of nomination from the State Elections Commission.
Independent candidates or candidates of newly formed or minor parties may appear on the general election ballot only if they pay a $1,200 filing fee and submit petitions signed by 4% of the voters who cast ballots in the most recent gubernatorial election. State Y asserts that these requirements are necessary to reduce ballot overcrowding, discourage frivolous campaigns, and contribute to election administration costs.
A newly organized political party formed primarily by younger voters seeks ballot access for its candidates but finds the petition requirement disproportionately burdensome in comparison to the major parties’ requirements.
Which constitutional provision would be most helpful to the new party in challenging the statute?
A. The First Amendment.
B. The Tenth Amendment.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment.
D. The Fifteenth Amendment.
Answer
C
Although ballot-access restrictions often implicate First Amendment interests in political association and expression, those protections apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Challenges to state election laws almost always proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment because it incorporates the First Amendment against the states and provides the equal protection framework used to evaluate burdens on voting and political participation.
Here, the new party challenges a state ballot-access law. Because the restriction is imposed by a state, the constitutional basis for attacking it must be the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates First Amendment rights and provides the vehicle for asserting associational and equal protection claims.
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment is the most helpful basis for the challenge.
Question 12
A federal statute authorizes cities hosting designated major seaports to regulate the rates and services of all shuttle and ferry operators serving those ports, regardless of where passengers begin or end their travel. The statute expressly preempts any contrary state or local law.
The cities of Harborview (in State A) and Baytown (in State B) lie adjacent to each other. The major seaport serving both is located in Harborview and is one of the ports named in the federal statute. Acting under this authority, the Harborview City Council adopted a regulation requiring all shuttle services serving the port to charge only the uniform rates set by the Harborview Council.
Coastal Shuttle Company operates exclusively between Baytown and the Harborview port. It does not provide local transportation within Harborview and charges rates significantly lower than those set by Harborview’s new regulation. Under the regulation, Coastal Shuttle must raise its prices to match those charged by purely local Harborview shuttle services.
Must Coastal Shuttle comply with the Harborview regulation?
A. Yes, because the port is physically located in Harborview, giving the city exclusive regulatory authority over all transportation to and from the port.
B. Yes, because Congress expressly authorized this form of local regulation, thereby eliminating any Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions that might otherwise apply.
C. No, because compelling Coastal Shuttle to adopt higher rates constitutes an uncompensated taking of its business.
D. No, because applying Harborview’s rate rules to a shuttle service operating solely in interstate commerce is an undue burden prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Answer
B
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, state or local laws that discriminate against or burden interstate commerce are generally invalid unless Congress has authorized them. When Congress affirmatively approves or delegates regulatory authority, the Dormant Commerce Clause restriction no longer applies because Congress’s power over interstate commerce is plenary.
Here, Congress enacted a statute specifically authorizing the cities hosting certain seaports to regulate “the rates and services of all shuttle and ferry operators serving those ports,” even when those operators engage in interstate transportation. This federal authorization removes any constitutional impediment under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Although Harborview’s regulation requires an interstate operator to adopt higher, uniform rates—ordinarily a burden on interstate commerce—Congress has expressly permitted exactly this kind of local regulation.
Therefore, Coastal Shuttle must comply with the Harborview rule.
Question 13
Congress enacted a federal statute—containing inseverable provisions—establishing a new seven-member National Financial Stability Commission with sweeping authority to regulate investment firms, credit unions, and derivatives markets. The Commission is empowered to issue binding regulations and enforce compliance through administrative proceedings.
The statute provides:
- Four members are to be appointed by the President, with Senate confirmation. They serve six-year terms and may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.
- The remaining three members are automatically the sitting chief counsels of the Senate Finance Committee, the House Financial Services Committee, and the Joint Economic Committee. These individuals serve on the Commission for as long as they hold those committee positions.
After the Commission issued an extensive set of financial regulations, Monarch Capital Advisors—subject to those rules—filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute creating the Commission is unconstitutional, and therefore its regulations are invalid.
How should the court rule?
A. Unconstitutional, because Congress may not vest quasi-legislative rulemaking authority in an agency whose members are not chosen exclusively by the President.
B. Unconstitutional, because officers exercising executive authority must be appointed in a manner consistent with Article II’s Appointments Clause, and Congress may not appoint such officers itself or through its own agents.
C. Constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause to determine the structure and appointment procedures for regulatory commissions.
D. Constitutional, because Congress’s power over commerce includes the power to designate legislative staff to serve on regulatory bodies overseeing economic markets.
Answer
B
Under the Appointments Clause (Article II), “Officers of the United States” must be appointed by:
- the President with Senate confirmation, or
- (if inferior officers) the President alone, courts of law, or heads of departments.
Congress may not appoint officers itself or vest appointment authority in its own members or employees (Buckley v. Valeo).
Here:
- The Commission wields executive authority (binding regulations, enforcement powers).
- Its members are therefore “Officers of the United States.”
- Congress attempted to place three congressional staff members—committee counsels—on the Commission automatically by virtue of their legislative employment.
Because these individuals were appointed by Congress, not by any constitutionally permitted appointing authority, their service on an executive regulatory commission violates the Appointments Clause.
And because the statute is inseverable, the entire Commission must fall.
Thus, the statute establishing the National Financial Stability Commission is unconstitutional.
Question 14
Congress enacted a statute providing that the United States Supreme Court “may review any civil action filed in a United States District Court immediately upon the filing of the complaint, regardless of whether the district court has entered judgment.”
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an executive agency, issued a major telecommunications rule. Several telecommunications companies—though the rule had not yet been enforced against them—filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals, as authorized by statute, seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid for exceeding the FCC’s statutory authority. The petition raised no constitutional claims.
Before the court of appeals ruled, the companies filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, asking the Court to review the validity of the FCC rule immediately. The FCC concedes that the rule is of national importance and ripe for review but moves to dismiss the petition on constitutional grounds.
What is the FCC’s strongest constitutional argument?
A. The case falls outside the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and cannot be heard under its appellate jurisdiction because no lower court has yet entered a decision.
B. The case falls outside the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction because Article III limits appellate review to cases raising constitutional issues.
C. Article III prohibits federal courts from reviewing the validity of federal agency regulations except in the context of enforcement actions.
D. Article III requires that all federal cases not within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction must first be brought in a federal district court.
Answer
A
Under Article III, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is fixed by the Constitution and cannot be expanded by Congress. All other cases may be heard only pursuant to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and Congress may regulate—but not eliminate—the requirement that the Supreme Court review cases only after a lower federal court has entered a judgment.
Here:
- The companies invoked statutory authority allowing direct review in a court of appeals, bypassing the district court.
- Before the court of appeals ruled, they petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
- No lower federal court has issued a decision.
The Supreme Court cannot act as a trial court, nor can Congress authorize it to bypass the requirement of a prior judgment below. A case that has not yet been decided by any lower court is not within the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Therefore, the strongest constitutional argument is that the case is neither within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction nor within its permissible appellate jurisdiction.
Question 15
Several major corporations incorporated in State B have recently been taken over by large out-of-state conglomerates. After these acquisitions, the conglomerates relocated the corporations’ headquarters and operations outside State B, leading to significant job losses. Other State B corporations survived attempted takeovers but incurred substantial costs defending against them.
To protect local employment and prevent abrupt takeovers, the State B legislature enacted a statute regulating the acquisition of shares in all corporations incorporated in State B. The statute requires that any acquisition of more than 20% of the voting shares of a State B corporation within any 12-month period must receive advance approval from shareholders holding a majority of all outstanding shares as of the day before the acquisition begins. The statute expressly applies equally to purchasers inside and outside State B.
Assume no federal statute applies.
Is this statute constitutional?
A. No, because one of its purposes is to make it harder for out-of-state corporations to acquire State B companies.
B. No, because the statute will necessarily impede acquisitions by corporations whose shareholders reside across state lines, thereby burdening interstate commerce.
C. Yes, because the statute imposes identical requirements on in-state and out-of-state purchasers, regulates only State B corporations, and poses no substantial risk of inconsistent regulation by other states.
D. Yes, because the internal affairs of corporations are exclusively matters of state law, making the Dormant Commerce Clause inapplicable.
Answer
C
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state may regulate local aspects of commerce so long as Congress has not acted, unless the state’s law:
- Discriminates against out-of-staters, or
- Unduly burdens interstate commerce.
Here, the statute does not discriminate:
- It applies the same approval requirement to all acquirers, whether in-state or out-of-state.
- It regulates only the internal governance of corporations incorporated in State B, which is a traditional area of state regulation.
Thus, the law is subject only to the Pike balancing test. Nothing in the facts shows that requiring a majority-shareholder approval imposes substantial or unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce. The state’s interest in corporate stability and preventing destabilizing, rapid acquisitions is legitimate, and the burden imposed is modest.
Because the statute is evenhanded and does not create inconsistent regulatory schemes across states, it is constitutional.
Question 16
The legislature of State Y enacts a statute intended to balance its interest in protecting potential life with a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy. The statute provides that a woman may obtain an abortion without restriction during the first 14 weeks of pregnancy. After that point, the statute prohibits all abortions unless a physician certifies that the procedure is necessary to prevent serious harm to the woman’s life or physical health.
A group of physicians and patients challenge the statute as unconstitutional.
How should a court likely rule?
A. Constitutional, because the statute reflects a reasonable legislative balancing of the state’s interest in fetal protection and a woman’s right to reproductive choice.
B. Constitutional, because after the first trimester the state may treat the fetus as a person entitled to due process protections.
C. Unconstitutional, because the statute imposes a prohibition on pre-viability abortions without adequate justification, creating an undue burden on the right to choose.
D. Unconstitutional, because distinguishing between the first 14 weeks and the remainder of pregnancy creates an arbitrary classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
Answer
C
Under established Supreme Court precedent, a woman has a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability, and a state may not ban pre-viability abortions. The state may regulate pre-viability abortions, but only if the regulation does not impose an undue burden—that is, a substantial obstacle—on the woman’s ability to exercise the right.
Here, State Y’s statute prohibits all abortions after 14 weeks, except where necessary to prevent serious harm to the woman’s life or physical health. Fourteen weeks is well before viability, which typically occurs late in the second trimester.
A near-total ban on pre-viability abortions, justified only by general state interests, constitutes an undue burden and is therefore unconstitutional.
Because the statute bans abortions at a pre-viability stage without sufficient justification, it would almost certainly be struck down.
Question 17
For decades, public education initiatives encouraging literacy have been handled primarily by state and local governments, along with private organizations. Noting a recent nationwide decline in childhood reading proficiency, the President announces plans to establish a Presidential Literacy Promotion Task Force. The Task Force would launch a nationwide media campaign encouraging families to read with their children and would partner with private organizations to promote literacy.
No federal statute expressly authorizes or prohibits the creation of such a Task Force. The President intends to fund it through money Congress has already appropriated to the Executive Office of the President for “such other activities as the President may deem necessary and appropriate.”
A private citizen challenges the creation of the Task Force as unconstitutional.
May the President constitutionally create this Task Force?
A. Yes, because the President has inherent authority to act for the general welfare whenever Congress has not prohibited such action.
B. Yes, because the President is acting within the scope of executive power in an area where Congress has neither granted nor denied authority, placing the action within the permissible “zone of twilight.”
C. No, because education is a traditional area of state responsibility and is therefore reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
D. No, because Congress has not expressly authorized the President to create new executive task forces or agencies.
Answer
B
Under the Youngstown (Steel Seizure) framework, presidential power falls into three categories:
- Maximum authority when acting with express or implied congressional authorization.
- The “zone of twilight” when Congress has not spoken—presidential action is valid so long as it falls within the President’s constitutional powers.
- Lowest ebb when acting contrary to congressional intent.
Here, Congress has been silent: no statute authorizes or forbids the creation of the literacy task force. In addition, Congress has appropriated funds to the Executive Office of the President for broadly phrased purposes, which plausibly includes informational or promotional initiatives.
Because the President is acting in an area where Congress has not denied authority and is carrying out an executive function (public information and coordination efforts), the action falls within the zone of twilight and is constitutional.
Therefore, the President may create the Task Force.
Question 18
Riverport, a city in the state of Blue, is a major hub for companies that assemble electric bicycles. Parts used in these bicycles are manufactured both in Blue and in several neighboring states, then shipped to Riverport for assembly.
Acting under state statutory authority, Riverport enacted a business-license tax on all bicycle assemblers in the city. The tax is calculated as a percentage of each assembler’s gross sales revenue.
The authorizing state statute contains a “Blue-sourced parts incentive” provision. To comply, Riverport’s ordinance grants each assembler a tax credit equal to the percentage of parts used in its bicycles that were manufactured in Blue. Thus, assemblers using a higher proportion of Blue-made parts receive larger credits, while assemblers relying mostly on out-of-state parts receive little or no credit.
VoltCycle, a Riverport assembler, purchases all of its components from out-of-state manufacturers. As a result, VoltCycle must pay the license tax in full, while its competitors who use in-state parts receive partial tax reductions.
VoltCycle files suit in the proper court alleging that the tax violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
How should the court rule?
A. Against VoltCycle, because the tax applies only to businesses located in Riverport and therefore does not burden interstate commerce.
B. Against VoltCycle, because states may encourage the use of local products without violating the Commerce Clause.
C. For VoltCycle, because any tax measured by gross receipts is automatically invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
D. For VoltCycle, because the tax discriminates against interstate commerce by giving preferential treatment to products manufactured in-state.
Answer
D
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state or local law is unconstitutional if it discriminates against interstate commerce—that is, if it provides a direct commercial advantage to local businesses at the expense of out-of-state competitors—unless the state shows the discrimination is necessary to achieve an important, nonprotectionist purpose.
Here, Riverport’s ordinance:
- taxes all assemblers on gross receipts, but
- gives a tax credit only for bicycle parts manufactured in-state.
This structure favored in-state manufacturers by lowering the tax burden for assemblers who buy Blue-made parts while imposing higher tax burdens on assemblers who purchase out-of-state parts. That is classic facial discrimination against interstate commerce.
Because this discrimination is designed to favor local economic interests and is not necessary to achieve a legitimate government objective, it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Thus, the court should rule for VoltCycle.
Question 19
The city of Lakeview requires all drivers of municipal shuttle vans to obtain a city-issued operator’s permit. The permit may be revoked only for good cause. As a condition of receiving a permit, the driver must sign an agreement stating that the driver “will not display on or in the shuttle any sticker, poster, or sign advocating for or against any candidate for public office.”
The ordinance explains that the purpose of this restriction is to prevent the public from attributing a shuttle driver’s political views to the city government. Any driver who violates the condition is subject to revocation of the operator’s permit.
Harper, a licensed shuttle driver, places several signs inside her shuttle supporting her preferred mayoral candidate. Lakeview officials initiate proceedings to revoke her permit solely because of these signs.
Does Harper have a meritorious constitutional defense?
A. No, because she voluntarily accepted the permit with full knowledge of the political-advocacy restriction and may not now challenge it.
B. No, because a shuttle operator’s permit is a privilege rather than a property right and is therefore not protected by the Due Process Clause.
C. Yes, because revocation of the permit would constitute a taking of property requiring just compensation.
D. Yes, because the restriction is a content-based regulation of political speech that fails strict scrutiny.
Answer
D
Political advocacy is core protected speech under the First Amendment. A restriction that prohibits displaying messages that favor or oppose political candidates is content-based, because it targets expression based solely on its communicative content.
Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, meaning the government must demonstrate that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest, and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Here, Lakeview asserts an interest in preventing the public from attributing drivers’ political views to the city. That interest is not compelling, and even if it were, banning all political messages on privately owned signs within a driver’s vehicle is not the least restrictive means of addressing that concern.
Because the ordinance restricts political speech based entirely on its content without adequate justification, Harper has a meritorious constitutional defense.
Question 20
Shouter is a passionate hockey fan with a booming voice. During a heated playoff game in which several penalties were called against the home team, Shouter repeatedly jumped up, pumped his fist, and yelled, “Break the ref’s neck!” The crowd grew increasingly agitated. On Shouter’s fourth outburst, dozens of spectators echoed his chant and gestured threateningly toward the referees.
Although no actual violence occurred, an angry crowd surrounded the referees after the game, and police had to escort them safely from the arena.
Shouter was charged in state court with incitement to violence and convicted. On appeal, the state supreme court reversed the conviction. In its opinion, the court thoroughly discussed U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation doctrine. But the court concluded:
“Regardless of how the United States Supreme Court might rule under the federal Constitution, our state constitution provides more expansive speech protections. Under our state constitution, speech may not be punished as ‘incitement’ unless actual violence occurs. Because no violence occurred here, this conviction cannot stand.”
The state petitions for a writ of certiorari, and the U.S. Supreme Court grants review.
What should the U.S. Supreme Court do?
A. Affirm, because Shouter’s statements were constitutionally protected hyperbole under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
B. Remand, directing the state court to resolve the federal constitutional question it analyzed but did not decide.
C. Dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, because the state supreme court’s ruling rests on an independent and adequate state law ground.
D. Reverse, because incitement to violence falls outside the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Answer
C
The U.S. Supreme Court cannot review a state court judgment if the decision rests on an independent and adequate state law ground. A state-law ground is:
- independent if it does not depend on interpreting federal law, and
- adequate if it fully supports the judgment.
Here, although the state supreme court discussed federal First Amendment doctrine, it expressly declined to base its holding on federal law. Instead, it rested its decision entirely on the state constitution, which the court interpreted as providing broader free-speech protections than the federal Constitution.
Because the outcome of the case does not depend on federal law—and would remain the same even if the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the state court’s federal analysis—there is an independent and adequate state law ground.
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court should dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Question 21
The state of Blue imposes a tax on the “income” of all state residents. The statute defines “income” to include the fair rental value of housing or other benefits provided by an employer for an employee’s personal use.
Some federal agencies operating in Blue provide government-owned apartments to certain federal employees so they can remain near remote worksites. Federal employees are permitted to use these apartments for their personal living arrangements as well as for work-related duties.
There is no federal statute addressing whether states may tax such benefits.
May the state of Blue collect this tax on the fair rental value of the government-provided apartment?
A. No, because the tax would constitute a tax directly on federal property and therefore on the United States itself.
B. No, because the benefit is provided for the purpose of federal employment duties, making the tax an unconstitutional burden on the federal government.
C. Yes, because the tax is imposed on the employees rather than on the federal government, and it does not discriminate against federal employees.
D. Yes, because federal employees may not constitutionally receive more favorable tax treatment than private-sector employees.
Answer
C
Under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, states may not tax the federal government itself or impose a tax that is, in substance, paid out of the federal treasury. However, states may impose nondiscriminatory income taxes on federal employees, so long as the tax does not single out federal workers for adverse treatment.
Here, the tax:
- is imposed on residents generally (including federal employees),
- includes the value of employer-provided benefits for personal use, and
- does not target federal employees or federal activities.
Because the tax falls on the employee rather than on the federal government and does not discriminate, it does not violate intergovernmental immunity.
Therefore, the state of Blue may collect the tax.
Question 22
The City of Bluewater adopted a zoning ordinance restricting “adult entertainment establishments” to a designated industrial district located on the outskirts of downtown. The ordinance defines adult entertainment as “live or recorded depictions of nudity or sexual conduct, real or simulated.”
Jordan applies for a permit to open an adult entertainment club within the downtown commercial district—outside the zoned industrial area. The city denies the application solely because the proposed location is inconsistent with the adult-use zoning provisions. Jordan sues city officials, seeking an injunction and arguing that the adult-use zoning restrictions violate the First Amendment as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.
How should the court rule?
A. Constitutional, because the ordinance does not ban adult entertainment throughout the city and is justified by the city’s substantial interest in regulating harmful secondary effects.
B. Constitutional, because the type of adult entertainment defined in the ordinance is categorically unprotected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
C. Unconstitutional, because the ordinance excludes non-obscene adult entertainment from prime commercial areas.
D. Unconstitutional, because zoning restrictions that limit expressive businesses are permissible only when aimed at preserving residential neighborhoods.
Answer
A
Adult entertainment is generally protected speech, but municipalities may regulate the time, place, and manner of adult businesses if the regulation:
- Is content-neutral—i.e., justified by secondary effects (crime, decreased property values), not by a desire to suppress the content;
- Serves a substantial government interest; and
- Leaves open reasonable alternative avenues for the protected expression.
Here:
- The ordinance limits adult entertainment to a specific district, suggesting a focus on secondary effects, not suppression.
- The city’s interest in reducing crime and protecting the downtown commercial area is substantial.
- Adult entertainment remains permitted elsewhere (in the designated industrial district), ensuring reasonable alternatives.
Because the ordinance is a valid place-of-business regulation aimed at secondary effects—not content suppression—it is constitutional.
Thus, the court would likely uphold the ordinance under the First Amendment.
Question 23
Maria is a licensed childcare provider in State B. Under State B’s childcare licensing statute, the Childcare Licensing Board may revoke a license if it determines that a licensee has used the childcare facility for an unlawful purpose.
Maria was arrested by federal agents for allegedly distributing illegal prescription drugs at her childcare center, in violation of federal law. The U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute, and the charges were dismissed.
Nevertheless, the Childcare Licensing Board initiated proceedings to revoke Maria’s license based on allegations that she used her childcare facility to distribute drugs. At the administrative hearing, the only evidence presented against Maria was a set of unsigned written statements from confidential informants claiming they had purchased drugs from her at the facility. None of the informants appeared, and the Board refused Maria’s request to cross-examine them.
Relying solely on these written statements, the Board revoked Maria’s childcare license.
Maria brings suit seeking to invalidate the revocation.
Maria’s strongest constitutional argument is that
A. the lack of opportunity to confront and cross-examine the informants deprived her of due process before losing her property interest in her license.
B. the administrative proceeding was invalid because federal dismissal of criminal charges precludes further state action under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
C. Article III prohibits an administrative agency from imposing a sanction as serious as license revocation without judicial involvement.
D. federal drug laws preempt any state action concerning unlawful drug distribution, including administrative licensing penalties.
Answer
A
A professional license is a protected property interest, and a person cannot be deprived of it without procedural due process. Due process requires a fair hearing, which normally includes the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses—especially when credibility is central to the case and the witness statements are the sole evidence.
Here:
- Maria faces revocation of her childcare license (a significant property interest).
- The Board relied exclusively on unsworn statements from absent informants.
- Maria was denied any opportunity to cross-examine those accusers.
This falls short of the minimum procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause.
Therefore, Maria’s best argument is that she was denied a fair hearing because she could not confront or cross-examine the witnesses against her, making (A) the correct choice.
Question 24
The state of Silver sent two of its highway engineers to the state of Gold to inspect a newly developed traffic-monitoring system. While driving a state-owned vehicle in Gold as part of their official duties, the engineers negligently caused a major collision on a busy highway, injuring several Gold residents.
The injured Gold residents sued both engineers and the state of Silver in a Gold state court. Silver voluntarily appeared, admitted jurisdiction, and fully participated in the litigation. After a full trial, the Gold court entered a final judgment for $4 million jointly against all defendants.
Silver law caps state liability for tort claims at $200,000 total per incident. Silver raised this defense in the Gold trial, but the Gold court rejected it.
The plaintiffs now bring an enforcement action in an appropriate Silver state court, seeking to collect the unpaid balance of the Gold judgment directly from the state of Silver. The engineers are able to pay only $75,000 collectively. Silver argues again that its statutory damages cap prevents enforcement of the remainder.
May the plaintiffs recover the full balance of the Gold court judgment from the state of Silver?
A. Yes, because the Gold judgment is final, valid, and on the merits, and must be given full faith and credit by Silver.
B. Yes, because Silver’s statutory damages cap violates equal protection by arbitrarily limiting compensation for similarly situated tort victims.
C. No, because the Tenth Amendment allows each state to apply its own sovereign-immunity and damages-cap policies in its own courts.
D. No, because state employees acting negligently fall outside the authorized actions of the state, preventing liability from attaching to Silver.
Answer
A
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state court must give the same effect to the final judgment of another state’s court that the rendering state would give, so long as:
- The judgment is valid (i.e., the court had proper jurisdiction),
- It is final, and
- It was on the merits.
Here:
- Silver voluntarily appeared in the Gold court and fully litigated the case, so jurisdiction is unquestioned.
- The judgment is final and on the merits.
- The fact that Silver law caps damages is irrelevant—Silver already litigated that issue in Gold, and Full Faith and Credit requires Silver to honor Gold’s resolution of it.
A state may not refuse to enforce another state’s judgment simply because it conflicts with the enforcing state’s own public policy, including damages caps or sovereign-immunity rules.
Therefore, the plaintiffs may recover the full balance of the judgment from Silver in Silver’s courts.
Question 25
Riley purchased a costly online subscription service solely to watch the livestream of a high-profile public corruption trial taking place in the state of Blue. Midway through the trial, the presiding judge revoked permission for live video coverage, concluding that cameras in the courtroom were distracting witnesses.
Riley filed suit in federal district court against the judge, seeking only an injunction requiring the judge to reinstate livestreaming. Riley claimed that the judge’s order deprived him of property—his paid subscription—without due process of law.
Before Riley’s suit could be heard, the corruption trial concluded with a final judgment. There were no apparent errors in the trial proceedings, and no factual basis suggesting the case would be retried.
The judge moves to dismiss Riley’s federal suit.
What is the most appropriate disposition of the motion?
A. Defer ruling until all possible appeals in the corruption case are exhausted, because the trial might be reversed and retried without cameras.
B. Defer ruling until the Blue Supreme Court clarifies mootness, because this federal case is entwined with a state judicial proceeding.
C. Grant the motion, because the controversy is moot and there is no reasonable likelihood that the dispute will recur.
D. Deny the motion, because Riley has raised an important constitutional issue concerning due process and property rights.
Answer
C
Under Article III, federal courts may only adjudicate live cases or controversies. A case becomes moot when:
- the injury no longer exists, and
- there is no reasonable likelihood of recurrence.
Here, Riley sought only an injunction compelling livestreaming of the trial. But:
- the trial has ended,
- there is no realistic possibility of a retrial, and
- therefore the requested relief can no longer be granted.
Because the underlying event has concluded and there is no continuing or recurring injury, the case is moot. No mootness exception (such as “capable of repetition yet evading review”) applies.
Thus, the federal court should grant the motion to dismiss.