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Employment Division v. Smith

Facts

Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church. As part of their religious practices, they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic substance, during a religious ceremony. Peyote was classified as an illegal controlled substance under Oregon criminal law.

Both Smith and Black were employed as drug rehabilitation counselors for a private organization. When their employer learned they had used peyote (even in a religious ceremony), they were terminated from their jobs for work-related misconduct tied to illegal drug use.

After losing their employment, Smith and Black applied for unemployment benefits from the State of Oregon. The state denied benefits, concluding that they had been discharged for misconduct, because they had violated Oregon’s criminal prohibition on peyote possession and use.

Smith and Black challenged the denial. They argued that Oregon’s refusal to grant unemployment benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because their peyote use was religiously motivated and part of a sincere religious practice.

The dispute moved through Oregon’s courts and ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court. The central constitutional question was whether the Free Exercise Clause requires the state to provide a religious exemption from a generally applicable criminal law (and related benefit consequences), or whether the state may enforce a neutral, generally applicable law even if it burdens religious practice.

Issues

Does the Free Exercise Clause require a state to grant a religious exemption from a neutral law of general applicability that incidentally burdens religious conduct?

Rule

The Free Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability, even when those laws incidentally burden religious practices.

Strict scrutiny is generally triggered only when:

  • the law targets religion or religious practice, or

  • the law is not generally applicable (e.g., it contains individualized exemptions or selective burdens), or

  • the government action implicates another constitutional right in addition to free exercise (sometimes called “hybrid rights,” though that concept is not especially stable).

Application

The Court rejected Smith’s argument that any law burdening religious conduct must satisfy strict scrutiny and be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The Court reasoned that adopting such an approach would make each person’s religious beliefs a basis for exemption from otherwise valid laws, effectively allowing religious individuals to become “a law unto themselves.”

Oregon’s peyote prohibition was not designed to suppress religious exercise. It was a general criminal law regulating controlled substances, applicable to everyone in the state regardless of religious motivation. The law did not single out the Native American Church or peyote use in religious settings; it criminalized peyote use across the board.

Because the law was neutral and generally applicable, the Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Oregon to create a religious exception. The Constitution protects religious belief absolutely, but religiously motivated conduct may be subject to neutral laws designed to govern society generally.

The Court also emphasized the institutional role of courts. If strict scrutiny applied every time a neutral law burdened religion, courts would be placed in the position of weighing the social importance of various laws against religious practices in countless contexts. The Court suggested that legislatures—not courts—are better positioned to create accommodations when appropriate.

Importantly, this case differed from earlier Free Exercise decisions where strict scrutiny was applied. Prior cases often involved individualized government assessments or benefit programs that allowed discretionary exemptions; in those settings, denying an exemption on religious grounds raised heightened constitutional concern. In contrast, Oregon’s law was a categorical criminal prohibition.

In future cases, Smith becomes the core doctrinal baseline for Free Exercise analysis: unless a law targets religion or lacks general applicability, courts will uphold it under rational-basis-like review rather than strict scrutiny. This case also directly explains why Congress enacted RFRA—and why Boerne later addressed RFRA’s constitutional limits.

Holding

The Court held that Oregon’s denial of unemployment benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A neutral, generally applicable criminal law may be enforced even if it incidentally burdens religious practices, and the Constitution does not require a religious exemption.

Court

The case was decided by the United States Supreme Court. The Court upheld Oregon’s application of its drug laws and unemployment benefit rules to religious peyote use, establishing the modern general rule governing Free Exercise challenges to neutral laws.

Exam Notes

  1. Leading Free Exercise case: neutral + generally applicable laws are valid

  2. Free Exercise does not require exemptions from general criminal laws

  3. Strict scrutiny usually applies only if law is not neutral or not generally applicable

  4. Courts will not constitutionalize religious exemptions across society

  5. Distinguish from unemployment/benefit cases with individualized exemptions (e.g., Sherbert)

  6. Explains the rise of RFRA and ties directly to Boerne

  7. Useful for hypos involving religion vs laws: drugs, zoning, vaccines, licensing, employment rules

  8. Modern Free Exercise framework: identify neutrality, general applicability, exemptions

  9. Key contrast: if law targets religion → strict scrutiny likely triggered

  10. Often tested as baseline before discussing RFRA/state RFRAs

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